Chronological Review of Failures Leading to and During the October 7 Attack
Israel’s military chief, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, has dismissed several senior officers and reprimanded others following a comprehensive review of the failures surrounding the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack. His findings describe not just isolated mistakes, but a broad, interconnected systemic failure—the kind that, in many high-risk industries, is addressed through a robust Human Error Management System (HEMS).
1. Pre-Attack Intelligence and Strategic Misjudgments
In the period leading up to October 7, 2023, the Israeli military and intelligence services failed to correctly interpret mounting indicators of an impending large-scale assault by Hamas and affiliated groups. Despite scattered warnings and unusual activities along the Gaza border, these signals were not elevated to the level of a credible strategic threat.
This misjudgment formed the earliest layer of what Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir later described as a “systemic failure.”
2. Operational Readiness on the Eve of the Attack
On the night before the attack, critical operational decisions contributed to Israel’s vulnerability. Surveillance capabilities, personnel positioning, and rapid-response mechanisms were not aligned with the possibility of a complex, multi-front infiltration.
Zamir emphasized that poor decision-making and inadequate preparations on October 6 severely weakened the IDF’s ability to respond in time.
3. Breakdown of Early Warning and Border Defense (Morning of October 7)
As Hamas initiated its assault at dawn on October 7, the IDF’s early-warning and detection systems failed to trigger an effective response. Militants breached multiple points along the border fence, encountering minimal initial resistance.
This collapse in frontline defense allowed attackers to advance quickly into Israeli communities.
4. Delayed Military Response During the Assault
Once the assault was underway, communication gaps and command-and-control failures slowed Israel’s mobilization. Units tasked with emergency reinforcement struggled to organize and reach affected areas promptly.
Zamir later acknowledged that decisions made during the attack itself were insufficient to protect civilians, describing the situation as a severe operational breakdown.
5. Protection Failures Inside Civilian Areas
As militants infiltrated towns and kibbutzim near the Gaza border, civilians were left exposed for hours. The IDF was unable to deploy forces swiftly enough to prevent large-scale casualties and kidnappings.
The failure to provide immediate protection—considered the IDF’s “primary mission”—became one of the most devastating aspects of the event.
6. Post-Attack Responsibility and Leadership Failures
In the weeks and months that followed, public expectations for accountability mounted. However, while the military initiated internal disciplinary measures—culminating in Zamir’s dismissal of several senior officers and the reprimand of others—the political leadership did not establish a national commission of inquiry.
This absence of a government-led review created a perception of incomplete accountability at the highest levels.
7. Growing Public Pressure and Demands for an Inquiry
On November 22, these frustrations manifested in mass protests in Tel Aviv, with thousands of demonstrators and opposition leaders demanding a formal state investigation.
The public pressure highlighted widespread dissatisfaction with both the preparedness before October 7 and the government’s response afterward.
8. The Human Cost as the Final Measure of Failure
According to Israeli figures, the attack resulted in approximately 1,200 deaths, around 800 of them civilians, and the abduction of roughly 250 hostages. These numbers underscore the magnitude of the failures at every stage—from intelligence and planning to operational response and political oversight.
Conclusion
The October 7 attack revealed a cascading sequence of systemic vulnerabilities inside Israel’s security establishment. From misinterpreted intelligence indicators to insufficient border readiness, delayed mobilization, and gaps in civilian protection, each stage contributed to one of the most severe security breakdowns in the country’s history. While the IDF has initiated internal corrective measures, public demand for a full national inquiry continues to influence Israel’s political and military discourse.
A Human Error Management System could have significantly reduced the likelihood and severity of these failures. HEMS focuses on detecting, mitigating, and learning from human mistakes before they escalate into catastrophic events. Applied to this context, such a system could have prevented or alleviated the breakdowns in several key ways:
1. Proactive Identification of Latent Failures:
HEMS emphasizes recognizing hidden organizational weaknesses—such as intelligence blind spots, overconfidence biases, or flawed assumptions about enemy intentions—long before they manifest operationally. This might have surfaced the underestimated threat posed by Hamas, prompting higher readiness levels.
2. Structured Decision-Making Under Uncertainty:
A mature HEMS framework requires standardized decision protocols that reduce reliance on subjective judgment, especially on the eve of critical events. This could have helped prevent the complacency and misaligned resource allocation observed on October 6.
3. Strengthened Communication and Cross-Checking Mechanisms:
Many failures on October 7 stemmed from communication breakdowns. HEMS encourages redundant communication channels, mandatory cross-verification of warnings, and clear escalation pathways—tools that could have ensured faster recognition and response to the initial attack.
4. Error-Resilient Operational Design:
HEMS promotes designing systems and procedures so that individual or unit-level errors cannot easily cascade into systemic collapse. More robust early-warning backups, automated alerts, and rapid-response triggers could have created barriers that slowed or limited the infiltration.
5. Real-Time Error Mitigation During Crisis:
In fast-moving situations, HEMS trains personnel to recognize emerging mistakes, adapt quickly, and prevent further damage. This could have improved the speed and coordination of the IDF’s response once the attack was underway.
6. Institutional Learning and Accountability Culture:
HEMS is built on transparent review processes that focus on learning rather than blame. Implementing such a system could have fostered earlier internal acknowledgment of weaknesses, consistent training based on past lessons, and a culture where raising concerns is encouraged rather than penalized.
By embedding a comprehensive Human Error Management System, the IDF and political leadership could have developed a more resilient, self-correcting security apparatus—better equipped to detect risks, respond decisively, and protect civilians. The introduction of HEMS principles going forward may be essential to preventing similar systemic failures in the future.
